Шановний користувач!
Якщо Ви рахуєте, що дана робота неякісна, порушує авторські права
або ж є проблеми з її достовірністю
повідомте про це адміністратора

English Law

Контрольна робота

№ K-19933

ВАРІАНТ №6
ПЛАН РОБОТИ
1. Прочитайте та письмово перекладіть текст.
2. Поставте 10 запитань до тексту.
3. Складіть речення зі словами, які підкреслені в тексті. Вкажіть час та спосіб, підкресліть підмет та присудок. Перекладіть речення .
4. Підберіть статтю на юридичну тему (на рідній мові). Напишіть англійською мовою про що говориться в статті (-20 речень). Стаття додається.
5. Напишіть розповідне , питальне (загальне ^спеціальне) та заперечне речення в :
Present Indefinite Tense (Active Voice), (Passive Voice). Past Indefinite Tense ( Active Voice), (Passive Voice). Future Indefinite Tense (Active Voice), ( Passive Voice). Напишіть переклад речень.
6. Напишіть тeмy «About Myself»та не менше 8 речень англійською мовою чому ви поступили до ОДУВС
7. Список літератури.
8. Підпис.

ENGLISH LAW
Until 1991 the sentencing system in England and Wales lacked a coherent rationale as retribution, deterrence, incapacitation and rehabilitation were all advocated as the aims of sentencing, without there being any explanation of how these aims were to be reconciled or of which was to take priority if they came into conflict. The essence of retributive theories is that punishment is justified because the offender is in some sense made to «pay» for what he has done, whereas the essence of utilitarian theories is that punishment is justified because it tends in some way to prevent the occurrence of future crimes.
In the late 1980s the Government began to consider the sentencing system and the relative merits of the various objectives which may be achieved through punishment.
The Government's approach was set out in the White Paper «Crime, Justice and Protecting the Public»(1990). It was recognized that rehabilitation, while it may be sought, may not always be achieved and cannot be used as a justification for imprisonment. Deterrence, while it may have immediate appeal, probably operates only with those who are law-abiding in the first place. The White Paper stated (at para.2.8):
But much crime is committed on impulse, given the opportunity presented by an open window or unlocked door, and it is committed by offenders who live from moment to moment; their crimes are as impulsive as the rest of their reckless, sad or pathetic lives. It is unrealistic to construct sentencing arrangements on the assumption that most offenders will weigh up the possibilities in advance and base their conduct on rational calculation. Often they do not.
The approach the Government opted for, therefore, was one based on the idea of retribution. The White Paper stated (at para.2.9):
The Government's proposals therefore emphasize the objectives which sentencing is most likely to meet successfully in whole or in part. The first objective for all sentences is denunciation of and retribution for the crime. Depending on the offence and the offender, the sentence may also aim to achieve public protection, reparation and reform of the offender, preferably in the community. This approach points to sentencing policies which are more firmly based on the seriousness of the offence, and just deserts for the offender. In 1991 the Criminal Justice Act was passed - reflecting in its provisions, to a large extent, the views expressed in the White Paper. The emphasis on retribution is apparent in that the concept of proportionality has been made a central principle of sentencing. The Act requires a court in passing a custodial sentence or a community sentence to impose a sentence which is «commensurate with the seriousness of the offence» (see ss.2(2)(a) and 6(2)(b)). Rehabilitation, as an aim of sentencing, has not been abandoned totally although retribution takes priority. The Act seeks to encourage the use of community sentences by making it clear in s.l (2) that custodial sentences are the sentences of last resort and should be used only where the offence was «so serious that only such a sentence can be justified for the offence. In choosing a community sentence rehabilitation may still be an aim as the court is required to choose an order which is both commensurate with the seriousness of the offence (s.6 (2)(b) and which is «the most suitable for the offender" (s.6(2)(a). The idea of imposing a heavier sentence for deterrent or rehabilitative reasons is eschewed. The Act does permit a court to depart from the principle of proportionality, however, where the offender has been convicted of a sexual or violent offence and the court considers either (a) that only a custodial sentence «would be adequate to protect the public from serious harm from him» (s.l(2)(b) or (b) that a longer custodial sentence «is necessary to protect the public from serious harm from the offender)) (s. 2(2)(b). In such cases the need to protect the public takes priority over the principle of proportionality. The system of sentencing under the 1991 Act (as amended by the Criminal Justice Act 1993 and the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994) has barely bedded in, but further changes are being introduced by the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997. The 1997 Act introduces mandatory minimum sentences for certain repeat offenders. Under s.2 a court must impose a life sentence for a second serious sexual offence or violent offence 'unless the court is of the opinion that there are exceptional circumstances relating to either of the offences or to the offender which justify its not doing so.. The offences involved are attempted murder, conspiracy to commit murder, incitement to murder or soliciting murder, manslaughter, an offence under s. 18 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (wounding or causing grievous bodily harm with intent), rape and attempted rape, intercourse with a girl under 13 contrary to s. 5 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956, an offence under s. 16 (possession of a firearm with intent to injure), s. 17 (use of a firearm to resist arrest) or s. 18 (carrying a fire arm with criminal intent) of the Firearms Act 1968, and robbery with a firearm or imitation firearm. Under s. 3 of the 1997 Act a court may impose a minimum sentence of seven years imprisonment for a third conviction for a Class A drug trafficking offence unless the court is of the opinion that there are specific circumstances relating to any of the offences' or to the offender, which would make the prescribed custodial sentence unjust in all circumstances. Under s.4, a court will have to impose a minimum sentence of three years' imprisonment for a third conviction of burglary of domestic premises unless the court is of the opinion that there are specific circumstances relating to any of the offences or to the offender, which would make the prescribed custodial sentence unjust in all circumstances.
These changes have been promoted on the unsubstantiated assumption that they will result in greater deterrence and public protection. They fail to take account of the widely differing circumstances in which offences of the same description may be committed and they do not relate these sentences to the general principle of proportionality in the 1991 Act. They also fail to relate these new provisions to the existing provisions in the 1991 Act which permit sentences to depart from the principle of proportionality to impose sentences for protective reasons in the case of violent or sexual offenders. English author Michael J. Allen says that there is a clear risk of injustice in individual cases unless the judiciary
adopt a liberal construction of the provisions giving them discretion not to impose the mandatory minimum sentences.
Murder in England and Wales carries a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment; the trial judge has no discretion to vary the sentence. The Home Secretary may release such a person on licence at any time during the term, but the trial judge has the power to make a recommendation that such a step should not be taken for a certain number of years. The Home Secretary is clearly not bound to follow such a recommendation.
Where the accused is convicted of manslaughter the judge has a discretion to award any sentence up to and including life imprisonment. Here, however, he is able to take account of aggravating and mitigating factors in arriving at what he considers to be the correct sentence. If the judge believed that, in the circumstances, no punishment was merited, he could award an absolute discharge. Under section 34 of the Criminal Justice Act 1991 where the trial judge imposes a discretionary life sentence for manslaughter he may specify a certain period. Where this is done the Home Secretary must release the prisoner on licence once the period is served and the Parole Board has indicated that it is no longer necessary to keep him in prison for the benefit of the community (A. Reed and P. Seago).

Ціна

100

грн.

Студенський каталог готових робіт © 2024 - Усі права застережено Адміністрація сайту не несе відповідальності за матеріали, які розміщені користувачами.